THE UNATTENDED KILLINGS IN THE PHILIPPINES

On of the most disturbing issues not carefully attended to is the killings of Filipinos upon their own.  A man next door was shot at 1030am while I was getting ready for work. His house is next to mine. The neighbors appeared not shocked at all.  They sat quietly on a porch staring at the dead body while police arrived.  There was no remorse.  There appears no ongoing investigation as if the police gave up because they could not find witness. The neighbor that saw him last had several different stories about how he saw him.  But police has not pursued thourough investigation to put to rest that there isn't a killer that lives in this neighborhood. 

It appears that killings go unresolved in a police statement simply because the ones who have the authority to pursue justice are the ones who allow it.  If the killer knows that police will now stop to investigate, he will do this again. A killer has a criminal mind, he does not have to justify why he does, especially if someone paid him to do it.MURDERED

Unjustified killings? Is that what this country is about? The meaning of life, does anyone care at all?

Digested Case on Abortion G.R. No. L-4795 November 23, 1908

Picture of an aborted fetus



G.R. No. L-4795            November 23, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.         MARIANO BOSTON, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The accused in this case was convicted of the crime of abortion as define and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 410 of the Penal Code.
Here, the counsel for appellant interposed the defense that  the evidence does not conclusively establish intention to abort in light of the absence of evidence in the record which would  disclose the character and medicinal qualities of the option which the accused gave to the mother whose child was aborted. In fact, the evidence clearly showed the child was born three months in advance of the full period of gestation; that the appellant, either believing of pretending to believe that the child in the womb of the woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a balat), gave to her a portion composed of herbs, for the purpose of her relieving her of this alleged fish-demon; that two hours thereafter she gave premature birth to a child, having been taken with the pains of child birth must immediately after drinking that herb potion given by her the appellant; that after the birth of the child the appellant, still believing or pretending to believe that the child was a fish-demon which had taken upon itself human form, with the permission and aid of the husband and the brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing the mischief which the appellant believed or affected to believe it was capable of doing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal should be granted on grounds interposed by the defense?

HELD: No.  The above facts constitute, prima facie proof of the intent of the accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and also of the further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its premature birth. The defense wholly failed to rebut the prosecution testimony warranting conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The sentence imposed is in strict accord with the penalty provided by the code, and was affirmed with cost against the appellant.

Digested Criminal Law Cases on Murder and Vagrancy

VAGRANCY

G.R. No. L-7529            November 19, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VALERIANO MOLINA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of vagrancy as defined and penalized in Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission, and was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and the payment of the costs of the trial.
The evidence of record discloses that the defendant was discharged from Bilibid Prison some time during the month of March, 1910, after serving a short sentence for a violation of the Opium Law; that from that time until the date of his prosecution on this charge of vagrancy, he had been engaged in no legal occupation, and was without any apparent means of support other than that supplied him by his mother; that he is an able-bodied man of 33 years of age; that he habitually neglected to apply himself to any lawful calling, and that he spent his time in loitering about the streets and frequenting cockpits and places where games of various kinds were conducted and where gambling was carried on; that he had been once convicted of a violation of the provisions of the Opium Law, and that he had been twice convicted on a charge of playing monte (a prohibited gambling game) toward the latter part of the year 1910.
The accused, on his own behalf, testified that he was supported by his other, with whom he lived, and that he worked on her property. The evidence in this connection is not very satisfactory, but it seems clear that his mother is a woman of very small means, and that if she has any property at all, it is so small as to be wholly inadequate to furnish even a pretense of work for an able- bodied man. The accused, in explaining where he got the money to be at the cockpits, claimed that on various occasions his mother gave him small sums for that purpose, and that when he won he brought her the proceeds. These statements of the accused merely serve to confirm us in our opinion that the defendant was an idle, shiftless and worthless man who made no attempt to follow any legal calling, and whose habits of life were those of an immoral and dissolute good for nothing.
In the case of Gavin vs. The State (96 Miss., 377), the court said that:

In vagrancy, the offense consists in general worthlessness; that is to say, in being idle, and though able to work, refusing to do so, and living without labor, or on the charity of others.

This definition of the offense substantially corresponds with the definition of that class of vagrancy set forth in the first part of section 1 of the Philippine Vagrancy Act(Act No. 519), which provides that:

Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling . . . is a vagrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to reverse conviction of the accued should be granted?

HELD: NO.  The Supreme Court did not find that the claim by this able-bodied man, 33 years of age, that he was living on the charity of his mother, can be said to rebut the other evidence in the record which tended to disclose that he had no apparent means of support. He had no legal or moral claim upon his mother for support, and indeed, from the indications in the record as to the scanty means possessed by the mother, it would appear that it was his final duty to aid her rather than to call upon her for aid.
The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by the trial court was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Murder

G.R. No. 182310               December 9, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JAN MICHAEL TAN and ARCHIE

FACTS:

After investigation of the prosecution, the above respondents became suspects in the the commission of parricide and two murders; their father, their step-mother and step sister.
Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan’s defense is alibi. They claimed that they were away when the crimes took place at the house. Based on Dr. Lebaquin’s forensic computation, however, the victims probably died at about midnight, more or less. The two were still at home when the killings happened.
 RTC issued an order, directing the City Prosecutor’s Office to submit additional evidence in the case but the latter office asked for more time to comply.²⁸ Meanwhile, the DOJ issued a resolution dismissing respondents Archie and Jan-Jan’s petition for review.²⁹
After a new presiding judge, Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, he issued an order on March 30, 2007 granting the prosecution’s request for additional time within which to comply with the court’s order of January 12, 2007.³⁰ On April 2, 2007 the prosecutor’s office filed its compliance and submitted its amended resolution in the case.³¹ The petitioners assailed this amended resolution and pointed out that the public prosecutor did not submit any additional evidence.Probable cause was found  against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan this time and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest. The CA granted accused’s petition for certiorari and reversed all RTC’s decisions.  After being denied the motion for consideration, the Public Prosecutor filed this instant petition.  Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed inside Archie’s room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe to the CA’s position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.

The Issues Presented

ISSUE: Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan present the following issues for resolution by this Court:

a) Whether or not the CA erred in finding  Judge Justalero gravely abused his discretion reversing his predecessor’s finding of no probable cause to the existence of probable cause

this is not the actual persons murdered in the case

HELD:

There was no grave abuse of the Trial Judge.The prosecution filed its compliance together with its amended resolution in the case. The judge considered the following factors: first, the DOJ’s denial of the appeal of the two accused and its finding that probable cause existed against them and, two, the local prosecutor’s submittal, if not of some new evidence, of additional arguments respecting the issue of probable cause. Grave abuse of discretion implies an irrational behavior. The reexamination was proper considering the said developments and the pending interlocutory orders. In finding of probable cause, it requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.

In this case, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision dated December 19, 2007 and resolution dated March 25, 2008; reinstating and affirming the dection of the trial court.

COMPLEX AND SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE

First under the RPC on complex crimes, component crimes are defined and penalized under separate and distinct articles and are committed under circumstances in article 48 of the same code…that is two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted from a single act, or one offense was necessary for committing the other offense.

Special complex crimes are component crimes constituting a single indivisible offese, and are penalized under one article of the RPC. For example article 294 provides for robbery with homicide as a single offense.

In the case of :

G.R. No. 192789               March 23, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
vs.
NGANO SUGAN, NGA BEN LATAM, FRANCING, GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON AKOY, Accused,
GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON AKOY, Appellants.

The Supreme Court stated that, "

the appellants and their companions clearly acted in conspiracy in committing the special complex crime charged. To recall, Gaga, Saligo, Ngano, Nga Ben and alias Francing entered Fortunato’s house, while Kamison and Cosme acted as lookouts. While his companions were robbing the house, Ngano brought Nestor outside and shot him. Reggie rushed to the scene, but Kamison and Cosme prevented him from entering the house by pointing a knife and a gun at him, respectively. Thereafter, all the seven (7) armed men fled together."

Also in In People v. Larrañaga,[41] the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime:

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659."

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime

A continuing crime also known as Delito Continuado is constituted by a series or overt acts committed by the offender in one place in vilation of a penal law such as Piracy which can vebgtin in our territorial jurisdiction and upon capture can end on the high seas.  The entire acts are punished under the crime piracy.

Digested Case on PIRACY G. R. No. L-17958 People Vs. Lol lo and Saraw

This is   CASE ON PIRACY which was decided EN BANC by the Supreme Court

G. R. No. L-17958 February 27, 1922

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
              Plaintiff-Appellee ,

            Vs.

LOL-LO AND SARAW,
Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS: This case is a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,attending rape and murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, they were arrested and were charged in the CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed a demurrer on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of piracy exists?

HELD: The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and not disputed and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind which can be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Therefore it does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184).

ISSUE2: The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code?

"Art. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor.

"Art. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or   firing upon the same.

"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book.

"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.

"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

"Art. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

"Art. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."

HELD:  SC Decided that there was no doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.


It is also evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances.

CASE DIGEST ON ESPIONAGE-G.R. No. L-44

G.R. No. L-44            September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:  Petioners file for a writ of Habeas Corpus as they were held by Us military for acts of espionage claiming that they were "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante.

Both respondents made returns of service attaching  commitment emanating from the Headquarters and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army Forces in the Far East,  Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. The returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, was due to proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur regarding the arrest of petitioner Lily Raquiza who was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment  U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. being charged as follows:

Commitment Order. — The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.

In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."

As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, was arrested by the same for "Active collaboration with the enemy."With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association with the enemy constituted a present security risk to the United States Armed Forces.

Specifically, the proclamation read:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

PROCLAMATION

PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.

WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.

Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR General of the Army United States Army Commander-in-Chief

ISSUE: Whether or not holding of the petitioners by reason of US Army, and its Intelligence Department investigation that petitioners are involved in espionage during occupation is valid notwithstanding that some of the petitioners are Filipino Citizens.

HELD: SC Held , there is no question that the power of the  power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned effects. Reason of the restraint of petitioners were upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;" and (2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations." The exigencies of the military operations for the destruction or defeat the enemy did not permit of any other procedure. To deny such power or competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military efficiency with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their liberation had to be conducted. Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons in restraint "for the duration of the war"? The Sc decided, it did not as there was no Presidential proclamation to that effect. The Court said in United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:

From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the President proclaimed it an end, July 4, 1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79 U.S., 700.)

The Sc dismissed the petition.

Article on the Concept of Remedial Law

Dear Reader,

In the 2006 Bar Examination, it was asked, what is the concept of remedial law?  Another way of understanding this question is basically knowing that it is simply asking its definition.  When we read exams its important to take a step back and understand what it is asking.  The answer to this is that remedial law is a branch of public law, which prescribes the procedural rules to be observed in litigation, whether the case be civil, criminal, or administrative, and in special proceedings, as well as the remedies or reliefs available of each case.  The importance of remedial law is that it has a vital role in the administration of justice because it lies at the very core of procedural due process.  What is  procedural due process?  Well this is a law that  hears before it condemns,  proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.  You may be asking what does this mean?  Well it contemplates an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered .  Remedial law is also known as adjective law. It provides for means and ways that actions can be effectuated.  In that sense, there is no vested rights and retroactive in its application. The body which is empowered to promulgate rules of procedure is the Supreme Court.

When we speak of procedural law, it means that this is the  judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for their disregard or infraction. What is important to consider is that  If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then the rule deals merely with procedure (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998).  Another question that came up in the 2006 Bar examinations was how remedial law is implemented in our system of government.  Well, since the Supreme Court has express powers as a judiciary to make the rules of procedure, obviously it would be implemented through the judicial system, its prosecutor service, or through quasi judicial agencies.  Earlier it was mentioned that the Supreme Court has express powers to formulate rules of procedure.  With this in mind, the same has limitations such that in making those rules, the rules must provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for  the speedy disposition of cases, be uniform in all the courts of the same grade, and not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The Supreme Court may also amend or suspend the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.

The next topic will be on court and jurisdiction.